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On the Politics of Development

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If the political sciences inquiry about problems of development has any meaning, it is the attempt to answer this question: how does development affect the political system, and, conversely, how do political systems contribute to development? This general question, when specified, acquires different aspects: which kinds of political systems correspond to each phasis of development? How much is a given political system functional for any given stage of development? When is it dysfunctional? What happens when the contradiction between level of development and political system increases?

This paper aims, first, to suggest a general scheme of analysis that could be useful for the study of this problem in a cross-national basis. We believe that cross-national studies are useful not only in themselves, but also as the general framework for more specific and historical case-studies. Once defined the general framework, an attempt will be made to test it with empirical data taken from the Yale Data Program. Finally, references will be made to the cases of Brazil and Argentina, whose military regimes will be the object of a further paper later on.

Three main idea-sources will be heavily used in this paper. The first are Apter's attempts to create a general theoretical framework for the study of comparative politics, whose main contribution, as far as we see, is the use of stratification analysis for the study of political systems. The main text here will be David Apter's Notes for a Theory of Non-Democratic Representation.

The second source is Peter Heintz' attempt to establish a general paradigm for the sociology of development. His main theoretical point, for us, is the concept of underdevelopment as derived from the transformation of the international system of nations in a class-like system, and the subsequent study of

the process of development as a process of changing patterns of stratification. The main text, for this purpose, is Heintz's Un Paradigma Sociológico del Desarrollo. We shall also use, in this concern, Galtung's conceptualization of stratification (Cf. Galtung, Johan: "Rank and Social Integration - A Multi-dimensional Approach", in Berger, Zelditch and Anderson: Sociological Theories in Progress).

The third source, finally, will be the recent developments on the use of aggregate data in Political Science. The main text here is Russett's World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators, from which our data are also taken.

This ordering does not mean any value ranking, but simply that we shall discuss and elaborate from Apter's framework making use of Heintz's concepts and basic hypothesis, applying for this some data and data analysis techniques generally used by the cross-national researchers. Our contribution, if any, will be the attempt of making a special mixture of these three sources, which are, we think, badly needing some cross-fertilization. This is why it was necessary to acknowledge our sources from the very beginning: we are interested on seeing how these different approaches can be integrated. We shall proceed, from now on, in a more systematic way.

# I - Development and Stratification

David Apter considers the process of development as comprising two basic and subsequent processes, modernization and industrialization. He describes the stages of development in terms of social mobility, i.e., of their stratification structures. The following table, freely derived from his Notes for a Theory of non-democratic representation, gives his characterization of the different stratification systems according to levels of development.

Table 1: Development and Social Stratification

	<u>Stages of Development</u>			
	<u>traditional</u>	<u>traditional modern</u>	<u>modern industrial</u>	<u>industrial</u>
<u>stratification system:</u>	<u>caste</u>	<u>class A</u>	<u>class B</u>	<u>functional status</u>
characteristics:				
1. boundaries	(absolute)	single-bounded	multi-bounded	(no boundaries)
2. boundary factors:	"primordial attachments"	relations of production	different rank-dimensions	-----
3. political claims:	(no political claims)	access to mobility (popular representation)	interests (interest representation)	functional representation.

So, in the traditional stage, society is divided into castes, according to some ethnic, familistic or sacred barrier (or any combination of these), there is no social mobility, and, consequently, no political claims except from those who are "primordially" entitled to positions of power. With the beginning of modernization, commercial, mercantile and administrative roles emerge, and, according to Apter, "it is at this point when political factions representing class interests arise" (p.11). The growing complexity of modernization, and the beginning of industrialization, develops "a middle class of the multi-bonded type, lacking class-consciousness, but aware of the self-rewarding characteristics of modernization". As industrialization increases, the class B type "begins to draw in both upper and lower class groups of the 'A' type", and this generalization of interest groups is, as far as we can see, what Apter calls "the 'embourgeoisement' phenomenon".

In short, the types of stratification system refer not to the whole social structure, but mainly to the characteristics of each strata. Table 2 is an experiment of introducing strata levels in table 1.

Table 2

	<u>Stages of Development</u>		
	<u>Traditional</u>	<u>traditional modern</u>	<u>modern industrial</u>
<u>Strata level:</u>			
<u>High</u>	Caste	caste/ Class A	class A
<u>Middle</u>	Caste	class A	class B/ functional
<u>Low</u>	Caste	caste	class A/ B

The fully industrial society, with the stratification system based only on functional status, at all levels, remains an ideal type that does not follow easily from the previous stages. Actually, the drastic differences between this last ideal stage and the previous ones indicates how difficult it is, in terms of social stratification, to transpose the threshold of under-development.

Let us turn now to the conceptualization of development. Apter defines development, structurally, as "the proliferation and integration of functional roles in a community" (Politics of Modernization, p.67), or, in more general terms, as "the process by which secular norms of conduct are universalized" (ibid, p.68)-. According to table 1, as far as the social system increases in complexity and universalism, the stratification system grows in differentiation and specificity, and the types of political claims of the different social strata changes accordingly. Table 2 suggests that this process of differentiation and specificity is lead by the middle stratum, and this accounts both for the early phenomena of nationalism and the subsequent process of "embourgeoisement".

Which is the epistemological status of Apter's conceptualization? I would say that its main value is its heuristic usefulness<sup>the</sup> for specific historical case-studies, and its main weakness is/lack of refutability. This non-refutability, due to the lack of sharpness of the main concepts, is, I would suggest, functional for the heuristic purpose, but prevents the testing of the main hypothesis at the same level that they are formulated. This is not, however, an inavoidable handicap of theories that are elaborated at this level of generalization. What follows, based on our other sources, is an attempt to redefine the main concepts in such a way that they could be operationalized and empirically tested.



## II - Development and underdevelopment

Following Peter Heintz, I would suggest, first, that the process of development in the contemporary world starts with a process of underdevelopment, which is something different than a low level of development, and has to do with the creation of an international stratification system. Secondly, I would suggest that the stratification structure and processes, if duly conceptualized, is the more useful variable for the operational definition of levels of development and underdevelopment.

The process of under-development is basically a process of creation of an international class-like type of stratification. If we think on stratification as a matter of access to desirable high-rank positions, a simple typology of stratification systems could be the following:

Table 3

		<u>legitimacy of access to high-rank positions</u>	
		<u>no</u>	<u>yes</u>
<u>accessibility of high-rank positions</u>	<u>low</u>	pure (caste) traditional system	transitional (class) system
	<u>high</u>	?	modern open-class (functional) system

Diagrammatic elements from the table:  
 - An arrow points from "pure (caste) traditional system" to "transitional (class) system".  
 - A dashed arrow points from "transitional (class) system" to "?".  
 - A solid arrow points from "transitional (class) system" down to "modern open-class (functional) system".

(from S. Schwartzman and M. Mora y Araujo, "The Images of International Stratification in Latin America", Journal of Peace Research, 3, 1966). (modified)

The international system is clearly located, contemporarily, in the transitional stage, which is characterized both by the legitimacy of upward mobility (the legitimacy of development) and its difficulty. A country can be located in the low ranks

of this system either by a process of losing status (atimi~~o~~) or by the incorporation of mobility values in an otherwise traditional setting. As far as a country, or a substantial part of its population, is placed in this situation, we can define it as underdeveloped. Underdevelopment, then, is the ratio between a given level of aspirations and the country's capacity of fulfilling it. At present, the level of aspiration is given by the dominant standard of life of the developed countries in the international system. This concept of underdevelopment aims to a situation which is very different from the process of industrialization and modernization of the now developed countries, which were always the leaders of the international system, since the modern times.

As the international system of stratification defines underdevelopment, so the internal stage and dynamics of the stratification system of the underdeveloped countries define its place in the development continuum and its patterns of mobility. The same as for the international system, we define stratification, here, in a narrow and precise way, as the distribution of the individuals according to socially relevant and accepted rank-dimensions (cf. Galtung, op.cit.) So, there are as many stratification dimensions as there are socially accepted values. In practice, however, only a few of these dimensions are relevant for the analysis of a specific case.

According to our definition, then, the more the population of a country has access to high rank-dimensions, as defined by the standards of the leading countries in the international system, the more the country is developed. This definition is tantamount to consider development as a matter of welfare, as it is defined by the developed countries. The difference is that the former definition opens the way for empirical analysis and further theoretical elaboration, as we shall try to show later on.

How does this concept of stratification relate to Apter's, to whom stratification is the universalization of secular norms? The difference is that our concept refers to a system of rank-



dimensions, whereas Apter's refers to a system of role-sets. The use of the word "status" as conveying the two meanings is in general misleading, and it is much more likely to be so in the context of this discussion.

Stratification as a system of rank-dimensions, then, is a matter of allocation of individuals in different levels of participation<sup>1</sup> in socially accepted values. So, if the values of the society include wealth, education, power and an urban style of life, we can say, from the individual standpoint, that the more he is rich, educated, powerful and urbanite, the higher is his position in the stratification system. From the nation's point of view, we will say that it is more developed the more it has wealthy, educated, powerful and urban people<sup>2</sup>. This is, if we may use the expression, a consumatory definition of stratification, as a system of rank-positions which are valorated in themselves and independently of their function and purpose.<sup>3</sup>

The other concept of stratification, in contrast, is basically an instrumental one. Social status, here, has the meaning of social rôle-set, and is, mainly, the position the person occupies<sup>4</sup> in the social division of labor. Strictly speaking, there is here just one meaning for the idea of high status: the concept of functional hierarchy. The relations between high positions in the two systems of stratification, consumatory and instrumental, is an empirical question, and a very relevant one both in organization and general stratification dynamics analysis.

Rank, then, is just one dimension of analysis of status, which can be seen, also, in terms of responsibility, permanence, congruence, and so on, including Parson's pattern variables. The characterization of a whole social system in terms of role-sets, or status, as a criteria or measurement of development, depends on a theory of the functional fitting of a specific status-system to a given level of development. The implicit theory in Apter's definition of development is that universal norms of conduct, rather than secular, are a functional requisite for development. To establish the functional

requisites for each level and type of development is in itself a long term project, and this is not the place for intending it. However, if we look at the literature, we will find that the presence or absence of some goods (manpower, energy, natural resources), institutions (industrial plants, systems of planning, communications network), functional roles (entrepreneurs, modernizing technocracies) and types of mentalities in these roles (achievement motivation, universalism, etc.) are in general considered as necessary factors of development. Accordingly, they are often used as indicators or even operational definitions of development, according to which rankings are established.

Although it is empirically difficult to measure levels of "universalization of rôles", data about manpower, energy and industrial development are easily available, and countries can be ordered according to these instrumental dimensions. The main focus of analysis, if we keep this distinction between consumatory and instrumental stratification dimensions, is the problem of fitting between them. The general hypotheses about this fitting can be phrased as follows:

1. Countries develop through the lines of consumatory dimensions, and create instrumental systems for this consumption only when it is absolutely necessary for their leading strata, or for upward mobile groups.
2. given the characteristics of the international system today, with the facilities of transfer of capital and know-how, with and without the creation of economic, political and cultural enclaves, development according to consumatory lines can be pushed relatively far without the creation of corresponding instrumental systems. However, there is a limit for this autonomous development, which seems to be placed around the level of five hundred dollars per capita. This is what we will be calling the ceiling of autonomous development.
3. During the pre-ceiling phasis, there is a differential accessibility to the different rank (consumatory) dimensions, and countries will develop according to the lines of less effort.

4. Until the ceiling limit, the autonomous development along rank-dimensions is the independent variable for the political process and the development of instrumental systems, given the international setting as constant. Above it, however, the political system or some non-politically induced development of the instrumental role-system takes the lead.
5. The transposition of the ceiling, demanding an intended change in the society's role system, implies also a change in the political system, and in the distribution of consumatory ranks. This change is not always possible, and, if it does not occur, an apartheid system must be introduced in the country, as a way of stopping further development through consumatory lines.

### III - Operationalization

A careful scrutiny of global indicators permit us to see the patterns of development along the different consumatory and instrumental dimensions. We shall take the data from Russet (op.cit.), and use, with a slight modification, his classification of 122 countries according to "stages" of development. A previous discussion of the indicators is necessary.

1. Urbanization: It is clearly an indicator of consumatory development, although a certain minimum of urbanization seems to be functionally necessary for the full development in both terms.
2. Literacy, School Pupils, Higher Education Enrollment: These educational indicators are dimensions of both systems of stratification. First, education is a factor of prestige, and a given level of education means a given level of consumption of mass-media, entertainment, access to certain circles and activities, etc. Secondly, of course, educational is a functional requisite for development. Our hypothesis is that, before the ceiling, education is

mainly a consumatory dimension, and one of the main problems of passing the ceiling limit is the fitting of the educational system to the functional needs. (This fitting does not eliminate, and in some cases even increases, its <sup>consumatory</sup> ~~functional~~ meaning. ).

3. Gross National Product Per Capita: As a measure of level of life, first, and of the dimensions of the economic structure, in the second place, this indicator covers both meanings of stratification. It would not be impossible to find specific monetary indicators for each of these meanings, although Russet does not have them.
4. Non-agricultural employment: As for urbanization, it is mainly a matter of modernization, but a certain minimum of non-agricultural employment is always necessary for any given level of instrumental development. Again, as for education, the passing of the ceiling limit conveys a problem of readapting the non-agricultural population which is somehow "floating" to instrumental activities.
5. Industrial employment: This is a purely instrumental dimension, although it does not discriminate above certain limits, where data about technology and capitalization are the only which can indicate, the differential levels of instrumental development. This is another problem of the ceiling limit: to rationalize and introduce capitals in an already large industrial sector.

The following tables present our data on these values, and we shall discuss them immediately after. Table 4 gives the list of countries in each "stage", according to Russet. The only change we did was to distinguish, within <sup>the</sup> "industrial revolution" societies, the group with less than five hundred dollars per-capita, which we labelled "ceiling stage" societies. Table 5 gives the mean values of our variables to each of the six groups, and table 6 presents the same values in relative terms, according to 0-100 scales. This relative scales are based on the assumption that both the inferior and superior groups are equilibrated and relatively stable systems, and, consequently, our indicators have



compatible and "equivalent" values. This assumption is not completely unreasonable, and is a necessary device if comparable standards are to be used<sup>5</sup>.

Table 4: Stages of Development: countries

I - "Traditional Primitive" Societies:

Nepal, Afghanistan, Laos, Togo, Ethiopia, Burma, Angola, Libya, Sudan, Tanganika, Uganda.

II - "Traditional Civilizations":

Mozambique, Pakistan, China (Mainland), India, South Vietnam, Nigeria, Kenya, Madagascar, Congo (Leopoldville), Thailand, Bolivia, Cambodia, Liberia, Sarawak, Haiti.

III- "Transitional" Societies:

Iran, Paraguay, Ceylon, Jordan, Indonesia, Rhodesia & Nyasaland, Egypt, Morocco, Surinam, South Korea, Iraq, Nicaragua, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Ghana, Syria, Tunisia, Albania, Algeria, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Barbados, El Salvador, Philippines, Turkey, Portugal, Mauritius, Guiana (British), Dominican Republic.

IV - "Ceiling Stage" Societies:

Mexico, Colombia, Yugoslavia, Hong-Kong, Brazil, Spain, Japan, Jamaica, Panama, Greece, Malaya, C. Rica, Romania, Lebanon, Bulgaria, Malta, Chile, South Africa, Singapore, Trinidad & Tobago, Cyprus, Poland, Uruguay, Argentina, Hungary.

V - "Industrial Revolution" societies

Italy, Ireland, Puerto Rico, Iceland, East Germany, USSR, Venezuela, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Israel, Finland.

VI - "High Mass-Consumption" Societies:

Netherlands, West Germany, France, Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Canada, United States.

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(from Russett, op.cit., p.296. Countries ordered according to per capita income, 1957).




Table 5: Mean values of stratification indicators

	<u>Stages of Development (strata)</u>					
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
1.% Urban (20.000)	5,8	9,6	20,6	32,6	37,7	45,3
2.Literacy (% adult)	12,9	23,9	41,6	74,6	90,8	98,0
3.Primary & secondary pupils over pop.5-19.	14,4	36,0	40,3	56,9	64,7	72,1
4.Higher educ. enrollment per 100.000	27,3	86,3	165,3	323,7	526,6	650,0
5.GNP/PC	56	87	173	363	629	1,330,0
6. Non-agric. employment as % working pop.	5,1	17,1	26,1	38,5	45,8	56,0
7. Industrial Employment:	2,4	5,6	9,8	14,9	20,7	25,6

Table 6: Mean values, standarized (0-100 scale)

	<u>Strata</u>					
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
<u>indicators:</u>						
1.	0	9.6	37.4	68.0	79.0	100
2.	0	12.9	33.7	73.5	92.0	100
3.	0	37.5	46.5	74.0	88.0	100
4.	0	9.5	22.0	47.5	80.0	100
5.	0	2.5	9.1	28.6	38.0	100
6.	0	25.3	41.2	66.0	80.0	100
7.	0	14.0	32.0	54.0	80.0	100



## I - "Traditional Primitive" Societies.

These are societies which did not start the movement towards development, and, in a way, are marginal and outside the international system of stratification, or related to it in a pure "caste" form.

The equation of the different development dimensions, in table 6 and graphic, indicates the assumption that there is a perfect fitting among all these dimensions. The fact that this equation is made at the zero level does not mean, of course, that there is no stratification, but simply that there is no stratification in modern terms: it is purely of a traditional kind.

## II - "Traditional Civilizations"

The name Russet gives to these societies account for the fact that they are above the agricultural level, and this can be seen by the jump of non-agricultural employment of 25.3 points. But the improvement of formal education is still higher, and it indicates that education is the more accessible channel of modernization in this stage. The combination of these two dimensions can be interpreted as if non-agricultural employment is a pre-condition for the beginning of education. We can consider, as a matter of fact, that little economic surplus and industrialization are necessary for the enrollment of about 15% of the age-school population, and, at the same time, little education is necessary for the creation of an income of 87 dollars per capita. In short, these are societies where modern stratification is strongly based upon formal education, and educational level is a purely consumatory rank-position, with little instrumental functions.

If this is so, it would be difficult to think in this educated group as forming a class of the "A" type, strongly based upon relations of production. This educated group is more likely to be basically a political group, disputing the leadership in the country with the traditional ruling group in the grounds of modernity. In a colonial situation it is very likely that this educated group acquires a nationalist ideology in its fight against the alliance between traditional and colonial rulers.

### III - "Transitional" societies

What is remarkable in this group is that, although formal education still has the lead (as it will have until the "ceiling" societies) there is a substantial increment of urbanization and literacy, followed somehow by industrial employment, but not by income. The decrease in the growing of non-agricultural employment indicates that there is not much of inter-strata mobility, although we can think that traditional ruling groups have or are being substituted by modern educated groups.

The growing of literacy and urbanization indicates the development of modern type strata at the bottom of the society, and the problem of the relations between the modern educated groups and this modern groups emerge. Some insight in how this problem is handled can be obtained from table 7, where the "transitional" societies are distributed according to their position above or below the average values of literacy and urbanization,

Table 7: "Transitional" societies, urbanization and literacy.

<u>Urbanization</u>		
	<u>High</u> <u>(above 20.6%)</u>	<u>Low</u> <u>(below 20.6)</u>
<u>Literacy:</u>		
<u>High</u> <u>(above 41.6%)</u>	Surinam, Taiwan, Barbados, Mauricius	Ceylon, Paraguay, South Korea, Ecuador, Phillipines, Portugal, Honduras, Guiana, Dominican Republic.
<u>Low</u> <u>(below 41.6%)</u>	Iran, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Iraq, Nicaragua, Syria,	Indonesia, Rodesia&Nyasalar, South Arabia, Ghana, Tunisia, Peru, Guatemala, Salvador, Turkey.



Table 7 shows that, at this level, development goes through urbanization or literacy, but seldom by the two dimensions simultaneously. Actually, the only countries where high values of both dimensions occur are atypical colonies, and we can consider that the development they have have been completely induced. The pattern of development along urbanization is mainly an Arab one, and the political pattern in these countries seem to be the conflict between modern and traditional elites, both mobilizing the urban groups by charismatic techniques. The literate non-urban countries have, seemingly, a modern educated ruling group that can afford some development in the countryside without being bothered by urban low-class mobilization. They are the beginning of the "apartheid" phenomena, that reaches its maximum in the next stage. The non-urbanized and non-literate group are embryonary stages of one of the two possibilities.

#### IV - The "ceilling" stage

In this stage we assist the high improvement of all the consumatory ranks except income, which remains lagged behind, together with industrialization. We can suppose that, at this level, modernization is practically completed as an autonomous process, and consequently an alternative emerges: either a systematic development of functional roles is promoted, or a stop has to be imposed in the drive towards modernization, by an increment of coercion.

Politically, the beginning of this stage is the place for the alliance between educated and urban groups, as in the previous stage for the urbanized countries. The difference is that, at this stage, the mobilization of the urban groups cannot be done by simple charismatic leadership, since autonomous low-strata forms of organization emerge. In Heintz's terminology, this phasis assist the transformation from "individual" to "collective" anomie in the low strata. This alliance leads to substantial jumps in the levels of the consumatory dimensions, and the problem of fitting them with the instrumental ones becomes critical.



V - "Industrial Revolution" societies

These are societies with, in one or another way, have broken through the five hundred dollars barrier, and are engaged in sustained development. A relative equilibrium is obtained in all relevant variables except income, and the society can be considered as engaged in rising its level. At this stage we can suppose that the educational system is being instrumentalized, the urban population is absorbed by economic activities, and there is a fitting between the use of the national income for consumption purposes and its use for investment. This is the place, then, where the conflictive and revolutionary phasis have been overcome. The political model is, in general, a highly socialized state, either with or without legal opposition. In any case, the stratification system tend to be based on functional groupings.

VI - "High-Mass Consumption" societies

These are the societies that are at the top of the international system, and give the patterns to the others. The equation of the different development dimensions, in table 6 and graphic, indicates the assumption that there is a perfect fitting among all these dimensions. The fact that this equation is made at the maximum level does not mean, of course, that there is no stratification, but simply that stratification is disappearing in the terms that it exists for the less developed countries. In this countries illiteracy does not exist, and, in contradiction with all others, there is almost no rank-differences between urban and rural areas. The widespread of mass-consumption, social security and education means that these dimensions are losing their power as prestige criteria. The rising of new forms of stratification, based on access to key functional roles, having as boundary factors criteria of achievement, create a new field of studies and problems that are basically different from those of the underdeveloped and developing countries.

#### IV - General conclusions and further developments

Let us say, as a first general remark, that this analysis of "stages" of development is not a study of the processes of development, although the temptation of the dyachronic fallacy is very high. Our data tell us about the reactions of each group of countries to the characteristics of the contemporary international system, and there is no grounds either to assume that the low-rank countries will be in the future like the developed ones or to suppose that the modern countries had the characteristics of the former ones. Actually, as we said before, development that begins with formal education, urbanization and literacy is indeed a modern phenomenon.

Our characterization of stratification structures leaves out many characteristics which could be highly relevant, and says very little about what happens in each situation in terms of political participation. Among the phenomena that are difficult to be studied by aggregate data, concerning stratification, two are of main relevance. The first is the development through the lines of political participation - taking "political participation" as a consumatory rank-dimension. High levels of political participation is measured, first, by the level of enfranchisement, and secondly the effective use of it by the population of the countries. The data about elections votes are highly distorted by political devices (the almost 100% of electoral turnout in the communist countries, inaccuracy of casting, etc.), and they say very little about the amount of political participation they imply. (Compulsory voting, in many of the Latin American countries, obviously mean something very different from the non-compulsory systems in USA and West Europe). Noneless, the comparison between the political systems of the contemporary underdeveloped countries and the situation in the period of early industrialization of the developed ones shows that political participation is a highly accessible status today, and a powerful dimension of the stratification systems.

The second phenomena are the development of institutions having

high consumatory connotations, which give rise to what Heintz calls "inter-institutional anomie". The most important of these institutions are, first, the armed forces, and secondly the educational system. It is possible to study the governmental bureaucracy from this standpoint, and see how the belongniness to this apparatus, independently and even in contradiction with both their broad class connections and their functional roles, originates specific political attitudes and behavior.

A further development would be to see which political phenomena correspond to each level of development and stratification structure. The difficulty, here, is that this would demand a much bigger universe for its empirical testing<sup>6</sup>. It is likely, in consequence, that we are doomed to stay with very general and non-verifiable categorizations, which could, however, be played against the stratification analysis,

Moreover, basic intervenient variables exist between the stratification systems and the political regimes. They are, of course, the political claims of the different strata and groups. These claims are not just a quest for representation, but assume also forms of collective behavior that could not be locally inferred from the stratification patterns, according to some more or less marxist assumption of "objective interest". The closer we can get in this line, at this level of generalization, is the use of instability measures.

Further empirical developments should go in two directions. The first is the work at the cross-national level, developing new and more refined indicators and reformulating and precisising the general hypothesis. The breakdown we did of the "transitional" societies, table 7, is a kind of refinement that does not demand more data, although the size of the universe does not allow too much in this direction. The second direction is in deep, and this again has two basic alternatives. The first is to keep the general scheme of analysis as an heuristic devise, and use it for the study of specific cases. The second is to transform our

assumptions of fitting and the consequent analysis of patterns of uneven development into hypothesis to be tested and verified. For instance, what kind of educational structure, or which amount of instrumental educational roles is necessary for the level of 500 dollars per capita? How much improvement in urbanization, or non-agricultural employment, can the limit of 70 dollars per capita afford? Which level of industrialization is compatible with which level of urbanization, so that we can properly speak on over or under-urbanized societies? Etc. Etc.

#### V - Brazil and Argentina

Brazil and Argentina are both countries of the ceiling group, and the study of their political processes, which is basically the study of the end of a reconciliation system, could be a good illustration for the difficulties of passing the 500 dollars barrier. Although Argentina has, in general, much higher levels of average development than Brazil, Brazil is a dual society where the "apartheid" system works by the distance barriers, and the characteristics of the developed part of the country are similar to those of Argentina. In both countries, the reconciliation system used to work with more or less strong tints of alliance with lower urban groups, and in both the possibilities of development through the consumatory lines came to an end around the sixties. In spite of the differences, the two countries have many other elements in common: the educational system, basically consumatory, created a status-oriented and conservative elite that was unable to create a political and institutional way out; and, when this elite tried it, it failed. Because, in both countries, the development of the state bureaucracy, and specially of the military group, also as a highly consumatory institution, went much further, and, by chance, had the control of the instruments of coercion. The present situation, in both countries, is that the civilian political structure is destroyed or in decomposition, and, at the same time, the failure of the military government of finding a

road is becoming aparent.

The comparative study of these two countries could, first, tell us how useful our general scheme of analysis is, how it could be improved, and, hopefully, which perspectives it could open for some glimpse of the future.

Berkeley, June, 1967.



Notes

1. "Participation", here, is not used in the sense of accepting the values, but of having them; is not an aspiration, but an asset. The study of rising expectations, as Lerner does, for instance, is important mainly at the low levels of the international system. In general, however, we shall consider that the level of expectations is given by the international system. Since we consider that the gap between aspirations and actual assets is the main determinant of social tensions, should not we conclude that the less developed countries are the more tense ones? Not necessarily, if we hypothesize that the gaps that really matter are those between different rank-dimensions. The hypotheses about rank-inconsistency acquire then a central place in this approach, as we shall see later on.
2. This is a "welfare" concept of stratification, that does not include dimensions of power. Our study of images of international stratification in Latin America showed that, although the general image of stratification is heavily influenced by the distribution of power (in terms of size, Gross National Product, etc.), the ideology of our respondents explicitly refused this dimension as a criteria of stratification. (Cf. Simon Schwartzman and Manuel Mora y Araujo, op.cit.). This corresponds to the fact that the power dimension is the more adscriptive one in the international system, which has an egalitarian and plebiscitarian ideology. Significantly, the problems of development are seldom discussed in terms of increasing national power, except when a <sup>n, international/</sup>revolutionary ideology is adopted.
3. "Consumatory" development clearly corresponds to the use Apter makes of the concept of modernization.
4. The "apartheid" model, created and applied by a not very outstanding sociologist from South Africa, finds its first beginnings of replication in the South American "favelas",

"mocambos" and "malocas" (Brazil), "callampas" (Chile), "barriadas" (Peru), "Villas Miseria" (Argentina), etc. Helio Jaguaribe suggests that, if a breakthrough is not found for the Latin American underdevelopment within the next ten or fifteen years, it is very likely that stronger and well-protected barriers develop, as a brake to the process of modernization. We could think on the present orientation of the Latin American military towards anti-insurreccional training and preparation as a beginning of this process.

5. These scales are used by Peter Heintz in his analysis of patterns of development in Latin America. The formula is:

$$X_{0-100} = 100 \cdot \frac{X - X_{\min}}{X_{\max} - X_{\min}}$$

There are other possibilities, and the most commonly founded is the calcul of "z" or "t" scores, where

$$z = \frac{X - \bar{X}}{s} \quad \text{and} \quad t = 50 + 10z.$$

The use of these standarized scores are similar to regression analysis, by which it is possible to say that, for a x amount of variable A, corresponds a y amount of variable B. Cutright ("National Political Development", ASR 28, 1963) uses "t" scores for analysing lags and leads between a mass-communications index and indexes of development, as we do for consumatory and instrumental development. The differences are that each standardization technique implies different sociological assumptions, which are not always explicit. So, while our scale suppose equivalence in the extremes, "t" or "z" scores suppose equivalence throughout the regression straigh line. For a discussion of this problem, cf. S. Schwartzman and M. Mora y Araujo, Proyecto Sobre Tensiones Sociales y Desarrollo, Fundación Bariloche, Buenos Aires, 1967.